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Valuing Laws as Local Amenities
Anup Malani1
June 19, 2007
ABSTRACT. The conventional approach to evaluating a law is to examine its
effect on proximate behavior. To evaluate a new criminal law, for example, the
conventional approach would look to changes in the crime rate. This paper
argues instead that laws should be judged by the extent to which they raise
housing prices and lower wages. The logic is that the value of a law, much like
the value of a lake or a public school, is capitalized into local housing and labor
markets. Desirable laws increase housing prices and decrease wages because
more people want to live in the relevant jurisdiction; undesirable laws have the
opposite effects. Evaluating laws in the manner has several advantages over the
conventional approach. First, it employs a more direct proxy for utility. Second,
it accounts for all the effects of a law, including hard-to-measure outcomes,
unintended consequences, and enforcement costs. Third, it permits direct
comparison of different types of laws, which is important in instances where lawmakers have limited resources to invest in law-making. Lastly, it sheds light on
the distributional consequences of a law. In particular, it makes clear that a
significant portion of every law’s benefits are reallocated through housing and
labor markets to property owners.

I.

Introduction
The value of a law should be judged by the extent to which it raises housing

prices and lowers wages.2 This may seem an odd way to assess the welfare effect of a
law. After all, higher housing prices and lower wages are thought to be bad outcomes, not
good ones. But the proper way to understand these changes is as signals of positive
outcomes, not positive outcomes themselves. They indicate that something good has
happened in the community. Housing prices go up because more people want to live
1
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To be clear, I contend that the value of a law is the sum of the increase in housing prices and the
magnitude (or absolute value) of the decrease in wages. So, e.g., if a law increases housing prices by $1 and
reduces wages by $1, then the total value of the law is $2.

there. Wages go down because more people want to work there. Phrased more formally,
higher housing prices and lower wages are how markets ration an attractive local
amenity. Indeed, the increase in housing prices combined with the reduction in wages
provides a measure how much people are willing to give up to enjoy the amenity.
Conventional economic thinking recognizes this when it comes to estimating the social
value of a new park or a better school. The same logic, I will argue here, applies when the
amenity is anything from a better tort system to smarter rules regarding capital
punishment.
This is, of course, not the standard practice. Under the conventional approach, the
welfare effect of a law would be measured by evaluating the law’s effect on specific,
related behaviors. For example, a three-strikes law would be evaluated by its effect on
homicides;3 a unilateral divorce law by its impact on rates of domestic violence4 or
divorce;5 and a tort reform by its impact on insurance payments6 and accidents.7 These
are certainly sensible metrics for judging the laws at issue. But none is as effective at
measuring the welfare effect of a law as a law’s impact on housing prices and wages.
First, the housing and wages approach employs a more direct proxy for welfare.
The conventional approach tells us how much, e.g., the felony-murder rule reduces
robbery,8 but it does not tell us how much people value that reduction in robbery. Yet that
is the very strength of my proposed approach. The increase in housing prices and the loss
of wages reveals how much the marginal resident who moves to a community is willing
to pay – in terms of lower non-housing consumption – to be subject to a new law in that
community.
Second, the conventional approach often provides an incomplete picture of any
given law. Frequently, relevant implications are too hard to measure or are unexpected,
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Thomas Marvell and Carlisle Moody, The Lethal Effects of Three-Strikes Laws, 30 J. Legal Studies 89
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4
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Distress, NBER Working Paper 10175 (2003).
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Rev. 608 (1998).
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and are therefore left out of the empirical analysis. For example, a typical study might
ignore the expressive benefits of an anti-discrimination law9 or the placebo effects of
corporate governance reforms10 because these consequences are so hard to quantify. With
respect to unexpected outcomes, until recently scholars studying abortion rights
overlooked the important effect of abortion rights on crime rates.11 The conventional
approach also tends to ignore the enforcement costs of laws, whether direct (higher
property taxes) or indirect (reduction of other government services). The housing and
wages approach does not suffer these omissions. It provides a measure of the net benefits
of a law, accounting for intangible benefits, unintended consequences, and enforcement
costs.
Third, because the conventional approach uses setting-specific metrics for
evaluating different laws, it does not permit a direct comparison of different types of
laws. For example, it cannot tell us whether it is better to have gay marriage,12 capital
punishment,13 or exceptions to employment-at-will.14 But the housing and wages
approach can. The reason is that it compares all laws by their effect on a common
outcome: the increase in housing prices plus the decrease in wages. The resulting ability
to compare different types of laws is quite valuable. For one thing, legislators have
limited time and resources. Studies that rank legal reforms will allow legislators to focus
on those changes that have the biggest positive impact on residents of their jurisdiction.
Such a ranking will also help voters choose among candidates based on policies that
actually impact welfare, rather than policies that mainly stroke emotions.
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Michael Ashley Stein, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis of the ADA, 92
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Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J. Law & Econ. 453 (2003); Joanna Shepherd, Murders of
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See, e.g., Thomas Miles, Common Law Exceptions to Employment at Will and U.S. Labor Markets," 16
J. L. Econ. & Org. 74 (2000); David Autor et al., The Costs of Wrongful Discharge Laws, MIT Working
Paper (May 2005).
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Finally, the housing and wages approach offers a benefit that goes beyond simply
being able to better measure the value of a law. It provides an important insight into the
distributive impact of that law. Because local housing is necessary to enjoy a local law,
and because people are mobile, but housing is not, a significant part of the welfare gains
(or losses) from a local law accrue to the suppliers of housing, i.e., the owners of local
property. As a result, a law may not have the precise distributional impact that its authors
intend. In other words, labor market forces alter the assignment of gains and losses from
a law and unless lawmakers take this into account, they may not achieve an important
component of their objectives.
To be clear, this paper does not contend that the housing and wages approach
offers a perfect measure of welfare. It has important limitations. From a normative
perspective, it gives disproportionate weight to individuals with greater income. It
ignores individuals – such as children, prisoners and military personnel – who do not
participate in the housing market. And there are some leakages when evaluating, for
example, laws which convey benefits or impose costs on other jurisdictions. But, for the
reasons given above, it is a better second-best than the conventional approach to valuing
the within-jurisdiction benefits of a law, as well as competing methods for estimating the
willingness-to-pay for public goods. Moreover, so long as the limitations inherent in my
approach affect all applications equally, it can still be used to conduct relative welfare
analysis or rank different legal reforms.
Skeptics will surely wonder whether there is too much noise in housing and wage
data to identify the (likely small) effects that any individual law has on those outcomes.
But this is an empirical question and the paper offers an empirical answer. It examines
the effect of five types of laws (tort reforms, abortion access laws, no-fault automobile
liability, unilateral divorce laws, and health insurance mandates) on local housing prices
and wages. Data on housing prices and characteristics are drawn from the American
Housing Survey. This survey spans odd years from 1974–2003 and includes over 50,000
households per year. Data on wages are from the Current Population Survey. The March
portion of the survey provides useful data annually from 1979–2003 on up to 15,000
individuals per year. Data on laws are from recent studies by Alma Cohen, Leora
Friedberg, Jonathan Klick, RAND, Paul Rubin, Joanna Shepherd, Betsey Stevenson,
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Thomas Stratmann, and Justin Wolfers. My results suggest that tort reform may reduce
local welfare and that diabetes coverage mandates may raise local welfare.15 These stand
in contrast to the findings of the conventional approach to evaluating these laws.
This paper relates to an extensive literature on the so-called hedonic valuation
method in the fields of environmental, labor and urban economics. That method attempts
to measure the value of a given product characteristic that is bundled with other product
characteristics by examining how changes in the characteristic affect product prices. The
characteristics that environmental and urban economists are interested in valuing are
local amenities such as lakes or schools. They have tended to focus, however, on the
capitalization of these amenities into the price of housing not wages. Labor economists
are not concerned with valuing local amenities so much as using the presence of
amenities to explain persistent regional variation in price of labor, i.e., wages. In these
literatures, this paper most closely relates to a line of papers beginning with Roback
(1982), which offered a simple general equilibrium model to demonstrate how local
amenities were capitalized in both the housing prices and wages.16
This paper also relates to the literature on Tiebout sorting, which focuses on the
migration that causes the capitalization of amenities into local prices.17 It is most closely
connected to, though distinct in purpose from, recent work by William Fischel, which
also belongs to the field of local government law. Fischel’s “homevoter hypothesis”
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I stress, however, that these findings have not been demonstrated robust to, for example, self selection.
While this and other problems are common to both my approach and those of the papers from which they
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evaluations.
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Roback, Jennifer, Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life, 90 J. Pol. Econ. 1257-1278 (1982). See also,
Glenn C. Blomquist, Mark C. Berger, and John P. Hoehn, New Estimates of Quality of Life in Urban
Areas, 78(1) Amer. Econ. Rev. 89-107 (1988). These papers were spurred by two seminal papers by
Sherwin Rosen: Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82 J.
Pol. Econ. 34-55 (1974) and Wage-based indexes of urban quality of life, In P. Mieszkowski and M.
Straszheim, eds., Current issues in urban economics (1979). Interestingly, three important law and
economics scholars have written on this topic, though at the time they were working in the field of public
finance and did not spell out the implications of their work for the empirical analysis of laws, A. Mitchell
Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Amenities and Property Values in a Model of an Urban Area, 5 J. Pub. Econ.
119-129 (1976) and A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Property Values and the Benefits of
Environmental Improvements: Theory and Measurement, in Lowdon Wingo and Alan Evans, eds., Public
Economics and the Quality of Life (1977).)
17
Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416-424. Tiebout’s goal was to
respond to Paul Samuelson’s claim that market processes could not produce the optimal level of public
expenditures on public goods. Tiebout claimed that migration – a market process – could produce optimal
expenditure by moving people to good government rather than by improving local government.
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argues that, because local government policies (even those creating public goods) are
capitalized into housing prices and homeowners vote based on the value of their homes,
local governments follow policies that maximize local welfare.18 This paper agrees with
the claim that local laws (as opposed to policies broadly19) are capitalized into housing
prices. However, my goal is not to explain voting but to value laws. Moreover, my
analysis focuses not on local laws, but on state and even national laws. Fischel
specifically rejects the homevoter hypothesis beyond the local government level.20 Lastly,
Fischel ignores capitalization of amenities into rental properties and wages, which he
does not think motivates voting.21 I focus equally on renters and owners and on housing
and labor markets.
Against this background, my paper makes four discrete contributions. Although it
is not the first paper to examine the effect of a law on housing prices, it is the first paper
that neither examines a law closely related to the housing market – such as an
environmental, property or educational law22 – nor views a law as a proxy (or
“instrumental variable”) for an underlying neighborhood characteristic that is the true
variable of interest.23 Second, it is the first paper that examines the effect of a law on both
housing price and wages; in other words it is the first to account for the fact that the value
of a law is capitalized into multiple markets. Third, although it is not first paper to
employ a differences-in-differences estimator to value a local amenity, it is the first to
apply this strategy with a large panel data set that spans many jurisdictions and a large
number of years. Fourth, and most importantly, this is first paper to make the general case
for employing hedonic analysis to evaluate the net welfare and distributional effects of a
law, a contribution to the law and economics literature.

18

William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis 1-18 (2001). So Fischel’s response to Samuelson is that
local government politics can provide the optimal level of goods without actual migration.
19
To see examples of the difference, consider the examples of capitalization Fischel offers. Id. at 45.
20
Id. at 53-54.
21
Id. at 14, 80.
22
Greenstone, Michael, and Justin Gallagher, Does hazardous waste matter? Evidence from the housing
market and the superfund program, NBER Working Paper No. 11790 (2005); J.M. Pogodzinski and Tim R.
Sass, Zoning and Hedonic Housing Price Models, 1 J. Housing Econ. 271-292 (1991); David N. Figlio and
Maurice E. Lucas, What’s in a Grade? School Report Cards and the Housing Market, 94 Amer. Econ. Rev.
591-604 (2004).
23
See Greenstone and Gallagher, supra note 22.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II explains why the
value of a law is capitalized into housing prices and labor wages.24 It also compares the
housing and wages approach to the conventional approach to valuing a law. Section III
addresses the interaction between the housing and price method and the process of
lawmaking. Finally Section IV illustrates the housing and wages approach by employing
it to evaluate an array of laws.
II.

The housing and wages approach
A simple example can illustrate how the value of a local law is capitalized into

local housing prices and wages. Consider two contiguous states with identical laws,
housing prices and wages. Because the two states are identical, there is no migration
between them. Suppose, however, that the first state passes a law that directly improves
the welfare of its residents. By this I mean it is a law that people prefer for personal
reasons. It might be a felon disenfranchisement law that makes a statement about felons25
or a parental notification law that comforts parents of teenagers.26
Residents of the second state, who also prefer the law, will begin to move to the
first state, in order to enjoy the law. This movement has two effects. First, because
migrants need housing, the demand for housing will increase and housing prices will rise.
Second, because migrants need jobs, the supply of labor will increase and wages will fall.
The migration from the second state to the first state will continue until the increase in
housing prices and the reduction in wages is such that remaining residents of the second
state are indifferent between living under the new law in the first state and enjoying the
lower housing prices and higher wages in the second state. At that point there is no net
gain to an individual’s welfare from living under the new law so the second state’s
remaining residents stay put. In other words, local housing prices and wages adjust to
restore an equilibrium in which there is no further migration between the two states.
A useful byproduct of this equilibrating process is that we now have a measure of
the value of the new law: the amount that housing prices rise plus the amount that wages
24

A simple model is provided in Roback, supra note 16.
Thomas Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. Legal Stud. 118 (2004).
26
Jonathan Klick and Thomas Stratmann, Abortion Access Laws and Risky Sex Among Teens: Parental
Involvement Laws and Sexually Transmitted Diseases, working paper 1 (Oct. 2005).
25
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fall. Economists call this the “compensating differential” for enjoying the law. That is the
most the marginal resident – the resident that is indifferent between living the first or
second state – is willing to give up (or pay) to live under the law. In the abstract, if you
offered that individual the ability to live under the new law at a price once cent below the
compensating differential, she would accept. If you charged her one cent more, she would
say no thanks.
Although this illustration provides the intuition behind the housing and wages
approach, it omits some important details. These details fall into three categories: First,
how the equilibrating process works. Second, whether the process works with more
complex laws. Third, how much information my marginal willingness-to-pay measure
provides about the total welfare effects of a law.
A. How the equilibrating process works
The first bit of detail that might be useful is what happens to individuals who
were living in the first state before the legal change. Where do they go? In the short-run,
it is reasonable to assume that there are a fixed number of houses and jobs in each state.
So for each resident from the second state that arrives, a resident from the first state must
leave. But who stays and who leaves? The answer lies in the recognition that different
people will value the new law differently. Some in the first state will value it more than
some in the second state, and vice versa. If you group all the people of the two states
together, it is the people who value the law the most that will end up in the first state. If
they were in the first state before it passed the new law, they will remain. If they were in
the second state, they will purchase houses and take jobs from first state residents who
don’t value the new law as highly as they do. Ignore jobs for a moment. Because houses
are in limited supply, migrants will have to bid at least as much as the ultimately
marginal resident is willing to pay to live under the new law. If they bid less, there will be
another person from state two that will be willing to pay more for each house in the first
state. The marginal migrant to the first state, however, will only have to bid her valuation
for the law. If she bids more, she will find there is more than one first-stater willing to
sell his house. She will be able to lower her price and get at least one of the houses. When
we re-introduce jobs into the picture, the only change in the dynamic is that migrants will
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be bidding a combination of a higher housing price and a lower wage for space in the first
state.27
Does this mean that there must be actual migration due to the law in question in
order to apply the housing and wages approach? And is there even evidence that people
actually move because of a law change? Fortunately, there does not actually need to be
migration in order for housing prices and wages to shift in response to a law. All that is
required is that owners of property in state one see a law has been passed and change
their reservation price for their property28 in light of their personal valuation for the law
and their prediction of how future marginal state-one migrants will value that law. This
increment in reservation prices will be observed in sales prices even in transactions
involving two pre-existing state-one residents, transactions that are constantly taking
place. It is possible that state-one owners will incorrectly predict the value of the law to
future marginal migrants, but competition is likely to address that concern. If a current
state-one property owner overestimates the incremental value of her property, she will be
unable to sell her property even to another state-one resident and her reservation price
will not be observed because there will have been no sale. If she underestimates the
incremental value, another state-one resident who values the law somewhere between the
predicted value of the owner and the value of the future marginal migrant will purchase
the property and then put it back onto the market.
Even if this were not the case, there is some anecdotal evidence that potential
migrants consider the laws of target jurisdictions when deciding when to move. There
are, for example, numerous examples of gay and lesbian couples’ awareness of and
relocation due to unfriendly home-state laws concerning the legal status of their
partnerships and their relationships with adopted children (so-called second parent

27

A simple numerical example can demonstrate how the equilibrium is restored. Suppose that residents A
and B live in state one and C and D in state two before state one passes the new law. Assume A, B, C, and
D value the new law at $4, $2, $3, and $1 respectively. A, whose value is 4, will remain in state one. C,
whose value is $3 will bid the pre-law price of a house plus $3 for a house in state one. B, whose value is
$2, will accept the bid. (A will not accept because the law is worth more than $3. If C bid only $2 above the
pre-law price, then B might not have accepted because she was indifferent. C could not simply offer B her
house in state two, because that house – without the law – is worth less than C’s house in state.) C will take
the money from the sale and buy a house in state two at the pre-law price. She will have made $2 in profits.
D will remain put. Note that the new market price for homes in state one is $2 higher than before.
28
The reservation price is the minimum price at which the current owner is willing to sell her home.
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laws).29 Indeed, the importance of legal status in relocation decisions was highlighted by
a cover story in the Advocate, a leading magazine in the gay and lesbian community, in
2005.30 Moreover, Lambda Legal, a national gay and lesbian rights advocacy group,
maintains a website that lists states with and without friendly laws concerning gay
partnerships.31 Other examples of migration due to legal changes can be found in the
medical community, where there are numerous anecdotes of doctors leaving states that do
not enact tort reforms in order to curb their malpractice liability costs.32 In fact, there is
some empirical support for the proposition that doctors systematically move to avoid tort
liability.33 As in the gay and lesbian community, there are advocacy groups – the
American Medical Association for one – that maintain websites to inform doctors of
states with friendly tort law environments.34
A second detail that would be helpful in understanding the housing wage
approach is why the value of a new law is capitalized only in housing and labor markets.
Why not in the price of other products or services? Housing and labor markets are
29

See, e.g., Andrea F. Siegel and Nia-Malika Henderson, Gay Father Wins Custody Ruling, Balt. Sun,
March 29, 2006, at 3B, available at 2006 WLNR 5240768 (reporting gay couple moved from Virginia to
Maryland because latter had more friendly second-parent laws); Julian Sanchez, All Happy Families: The
Looming Battle over Gay Parenting, Reason, August 1, 2005, 30, available at 2005 WLNR 22497379
(reporting that a gay couple moved from Virginia to D.C. and then Massachusetts for purposes of
adoption); Maggie Jackson, Same-Sex Couples Face Unique Adoption Hurdles, Boston Globe, March 26,
2006, at G1, available at 2006 WLNR 5206595 (reporting a lesbian couple moved from Oklahoma to
Massachusetts for more friendly partnership and adoption laws); Stephanie Innes, 2nd-Parent Curbs
Driving Same-Sex Couple from Ariz., Ariz. Daily Star, at A1, available at 2005 WL 22483633 (reporting
lesbian couple moved from Arizona to California for latter’s second-parent adoption laws);
30
Kelly Griffith, Escape from the Red States, The Advocate, July 19, 2005, 42, available at 2005 WLNR
11375177. A sidebar in that article offered “10 tips for protecting your family when moving from state to
state.” The first tip was “Assume nothing. Check everything before making a decision. Seek the advice of a
gay-friendly lawyer in the state you are moving to.” Ibid., at 42 (sidebar).
31
See Lambda Legal, National Landscape: Existing Laws and Pending Lawsuits on Same-Sex
Relationships,” available at: http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/maps.html?record=2. In
addition, each issue of the Advocate features a section entitled “Across the Nation” that documents legal
advancements or setbacks for the gay and lesbian community.
32
See, e.g., N. Rishel, An invisible crisis: Pennsylvania's disappearing doctors, 104 Pa. Med. 12-16 (2001);
Erik Brooks, Escaping to Wisconsin: Medical liability crisis sends Illinois docs across state line, Business
Journal of Milwaukee, June 25, 2004, available at:
http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/stories/2004/06/28/focus1.html.
33
See, e.g., Daniel P. Kessler, William M. Sage, and David J. Becker, Impact of Malpractice Reforms on
the Supply of Physician Services, 293 JAMA 2618-2625 (2005); Fred J. Hellinger and William E.
Encinosa, Impact of State Laws Limiting Malpractice Awards on Geographic Distribution of Physicians,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2003). But
see David Matsa, Does Malpractice Liability Keep the Doctor Away? Evidence from Tort Reform Damage
Caps, working paper (2006) (finding physician supply response only in rural areas).
34
American Medical Association, Tort Reform, available at: http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/9955.html.
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different than most other product markets because houses and jobs must be locally
supplied. A resident of a state needs a house and a job in that state. A house in another
state or a job in another state will not do. Because the supply of local housing and of local
jobs is fixed in the short-run, the resulting increase in demand pushes up the price of local
housing and lowers the wage that local jobs must pay. Now the resident also needs a car.
But that car may be produced in another state and shipped to her. Because the resident
requires a car in whichever state she resides, moving from one state to another does not
change the aggregate demand and thus the price for cars. A more serious complication is
demand for local services, such as a haircut or automobile repair. Both the demand and
supply for these services is local. Traveling to another state for a barber is not an option,
and no out-of-state mechanic will fly in to repair your car. Nevertheless there are two
reasons we can probably ignore these markets without serious loss of precision. First,
incrementally higher cost of personal services is a much smaller portion of total income
than either the additional amount paid for housing or the loss of wages when living closer
to a preferred law. Second, even in the short run, local barbers and mechanics can more
easily supply additional hours of work than local firms can supply new jobs. In technical
economics jargon, the supply of personal services is much more elastic than the supply of
jobs.
But what about in the long run? Won’t higher prices encourage the construction
of new homes? And what about jobs? Won’t lower wages attract firms? Let’s tackle new
11

housing development first. It is true that in the long run, more houses can and will be
built. This means that any given increase in the demand for housing in the first state will
produce less of an increase in the price of housing in that state. (This is illustrated in Fig.
1A, which describes the effect of a change in demand when housing supply is fixed and
the supply curve is vertical versus when new houses can be built and the supply curve is
upward sloping. Note that the housing price increases less in the latter case.) The smaller
increase in price does not mean that the change in housing prices does not fully capture
how much the marginal resident values the new law. The reason is that the marginal
resident has changed. When housing supply is fixed, the marginal resident was the one
who took the last pre-existing house. When supply can increase, the marginal resident is
the one who takes the last new house. Because more state-two people move to state one
in the long-run than in the short-run it is necessarily the case that the marginal mover in
the long-run values the house less than the marginal mover in the short-run. If that were
not the case, the long-run marginal mover would have out-bid the short-run marginal
mover and taken her place in the short-run.35
Nonetheless, it may appear problematic that the housing and wages approach
suggests that the value of a law declines over time, even when we know that is not the
case. Fortunately, there are two solutions. First, in most cases, the long-run supply of
housing will not depend on the law one is considering. Moreover, the long-run supply
curve for housing is likely smooth and relatively linear (or of constant elasticity) for
small changes in demand for housing. Therefore, as long as one compares two laws – say
felon disenfranchisement law and a parental notification law – after the same lag, the fall
in marginal valuations due to new housing production will not alter the relative
valuations of the two laws. Second, although the supply of housing may rise in the longrun, the supply of land cannot not. Therefore, in long-run analyses, one should examine
the effect of laws on the price of land – or the price per square foot and floor – rather than
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It should be noted that the fall in the marginal valuation of a law is greater than the fall in aggregate
valuation of a law. The aggregate valuation of a law is the marginal valuation multiplied by the number of
people who reside in state one after passage of the new law. (In Figure 1A, the aggregate valuation is
“abcd” when supply is fixed and “cdef” when it is increasing.) Aggregate valuation falls at a lower rate
because the new housing production that drives down marginal valuations also increases the number of
people living in state one.
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the effect on the price of housing units to determine the value of law. Such data is harder,
but not impossible, to obtain.
Let’s now turn to the issue of new jobs. Just as higher housing prices lead to new
home construction, lower wages may attract more companies to state one in the long run.
This will increase demand for labor and raise wages, which in turn will reduce the
marginal valuation of a new law over time. (Recall that a law’s value is inversely
proportional to its effect on wages.) The important thing to understand, however, is that
the long-run labor supply problem is simply the mirror image of the long-run housing
supply problem. (See Figure 1B.) Therefore, a similar analysis is possible. The valuation
of the law falls because the marginal mover changes. In the long run the marginal mover
is a former state-two resident who values the law less than the short-run mover. In most
cases, this fact does not affect the relative valuation of laws at any given point in time. A
key difference between the housing market and the labor market, however, is that unlike
the supply of land (an input into housing), there is no fixed supply of firms. The
implication is that there is no substitute measure of value, like land prices instead of
housing prices, that can solve the long-run supply problem in the labor market.
Fortunately, this is not a fatal flaw. Because labor markets have flexible long-run supply,
the incremental willingness to pay for a law will in the long-run be entirely incorporated
into the price of land. It is as if the supply of jobs resembled the supply of cars in the
short run and like the supply of cars could be completely ignored. In other words, in the
long run, one need only look at the market for land to value a law.
The details about the equilibrating process that remain are more technical. For
example, do transactions costs – potentially including several thousand dollars in moving
costs, realtor fees equal to five percent or more of a home’s value, and the search costs of
finding a new job – limit the extent of capitalization? In my example they would, but in
real life they likely would not. In my example, a resident from state two has to pay these
costs to enjoy the benefits of moving to state one. If her valuation of the law is less than
these transactions costs, she will not move. Since transactions costs can be significant,
this means that a law with a smaller valuation will not affect housing prices or wages
because it will not trigger migration. In real life, however, there are individuals, such as
college graduates, who are already contemplating moving to a different state. If one of
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the candidate states adopts an attractive law, that state will attract such individuals even if
the value of the law is less than the transactions costs of moving. The reason is that these
individuals are already committed to moving and would have to pay the transaction costs
of moving even if they did not move to the state with the new law. Moreover, actual
interstate migration may not even be required for the equilibrating process to work. As I
indicated earlier, passage of a law may immediately change the reservation price of
property owners in state one. This would be observed in the sales prices of transactions
involving purely within-state-one moves, which are both more common and have lower
transactions costs.
Another technical detail is how the process works when, e.g., there is more than
one working individual per household. In this case, ` residents stop moving to state one
when the higher cost of a house plus the loss of wage for multiple members of the
household is greater than or equal to the value of the law to all members of the
household. The implication for my welfare measure is that individual-level valuation of a
law must divide the housing price effect by the number of working members in a
household.
Finally, one might wonder how does the process handles renters as opposed to
home-owners? Home owners pay for the right to remain in a home in perpetuity whereas
renters pay for the right to remain in a home for a one-month period. The amount that
home-owners are willing to pay for a law is the value they expect to draw from the law
over the lifetime of their home. The amount renters are willing to pay is the value they
expect to draw over a one-month period. Future value is not captured in the rent because
one-month’s rent does not give the right to enjoy the law past the end of the month. To do
that, the renter has to pay another month’s rent. The best way to address this discrepancy
when applying the housing and wages approach is to estimate separately the effect of a
law on housing prices and on apartment rents. The price effect will provide an estimate of
the long run value of the law. The rent will provide an estimate of the one-month long
value of the law.36 The rent may seem less useful because it provides only a snippet of a

36

The total welfare effect on a working individual (assuming one worker per household) is the sum of the
wage effect plus either the rent effect or the house price effect. The welfare effect on a nonworking
individual is simply the rent or house price effect. The investigator should not add both since no individual
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law’s value. But the rent may have some useful features, such as avoiding problems with
valuing laws where adoption is predictable. Such laws are reflected in housing prices
before they are adopted. They are not, however, reflected in rents before they are
adopted. The reason is that paying a rent before a law is adopted does not give a resident
the right to enjoy the law after it is adopted without further fees.37
B. More complex laws
So far I have focused on the case of a law that simply improves the living
conditions of local residents. Does my thesis hold up in the case of more complicated
laws? For my purposes, there are three types of “hard” laws:
1. Laws that affect production costs for business firms. Examples of the former
include laws that increase penalties for recidivist criminals38 or that require cleanup of hazardous waste. This category also includes laws that directly affect the
demand for products, such caps on non-economic and punitive damages or laws
that create new organizational forms, such as non-profits.39 It also includes laws
that directly affect the labor supply of residents, such as statutes that mandate a
minimum level of maternity benefits40 or greater parity between mental health and
physical health benefits in health insurance plans.41
2. Laws that that affect the demand for housing. Examples include a higher
homestead exemption42 or a more liberal divorce law.
3. Laws that benefit only pre-law, longtime residents of a state. An example is an
amnesty for residents with overdue taxes.

suffers both a rent effect and a house price effect. This strategy gives four different welfare measures: for
workers and non-worker in rental units and in occupant-owned housing units.
Since wages are measured on an hourly basis, the wage effect must be adjusted to map onto the
same time interval as rents or housing prices. With rents, the wage effect must be multiplied by the average
number of hours worked per month. With housing prices, one must multiply the average number of hours
worked over the lifetime of the house. This is obviously a more difficult calculation.
37
An interesting possibility is that one can, by comparing the effect of a law on rents versus on housing
prices, back out either the discount rate of residents assuming that a law’s value is uniformly distributed
over time or resident’s prediction about how long a law will last given a discount rate.
38
Joanna Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California’s Two and ThreeStrikes Legislation, 31 J. Legal Stud. 159 (2002).
39
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L. J. 835, 898 (1980). The theory is that
the non-profit form signals to consumers that the firm’s products are of high quality. This should increase
demand for the product.
40
Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 Amer. Econ. Rev. 622 (1994).
41
Jonathan Klick and Thomas Stratmann, Subsidizing Addiction: Do State Health Insurance Mandates
Increase Alcohol Consumption?, working paper (June 2003).
42
Hynes, Malani and Posner JLE paper.

15

I will address these in order, but before I do, let me preview my basic arguments. First,
my measure does not aspire to capture the spillover effects of a law, i.e., the effect of a
state-one law on conditions in state two. Such spillovers do however make it harder for
my measure to pick up similar domestic effects of a law. The size of this negative bias are
roughly proportional to the size of the state, i.e., the underestimate is larger for larger
states. Moreover, this bias is limited by the adjustment of production levels. The more
responsive are consumers and producers to price, the larger those adjustments and the
less the bias. Second, laws that change demand for housing do so because these laws
provide benefits from changing residents’ demand that equal the change in demand. In
other words, the higher demand reflects value properly attributed to the law. In any case,
rental markets (as opposed to home-ownership markets) do not suffer the bias from
individuals who try to game laws by modifying their housing demand. Finally, my
approach is inappropriate for laws that benefit only pre-existing residents of a state.
1. Laws that affect production costs
Let’s start with laws that affect production costs. Without loss of generality,
suppose that a law reduces the production costs of a given firm. This will have three
possible consequences. First, the price of the firm’s product will fall, which will benefit
individual consumers. Second, the firm might make greater profits, which will benefit its
individual owners. Third, the firm will increase output (or new firms will open in the
state) to satisfy greater consumer demand, which will increase the demand for labor and
individual workers’ wages. 43 (By assumption, firms don’t have preferences and therefore
do not matter to welfare calculations. How firms affect individual utility, however, does
matter to welfare.) How effective my metric is at capturing these welfare gains depends
on whether consumption of the firm’s products and ownership of the firm are local. A
good example of a business with mainly local consumers and local owners is a small
restaurant. An example of a non-local business is a car manufacturer which ships
products and whose equity owners are scattered around the world. If consumption is
43

See, e.g., Jonathan Klick and Thomas Stratmann, Does Medical Malpractice Reform Help States Retain
Physicians and Does It Matter?, working paper (Nov. 2005); Daniel Kessler, William Sage, and David
Becker, Impact of Malpractice Reforms on the Supply of Physician Services, 293(21) J. Amer. Med. Ass’n
2618-2625 (2005).
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local, migrants will want to move to the state in order to enjoy the benefits of the new
law. The amount they are willing to sacrifice – in terms of higher housing prices and
lower wages – is equal to the amount of lower prices they’ll enjoy by residing in the state.
The same logic applies to potential business owners if ownership is local. They will bid
away the value of the additional profits from residing in the state.44
What if consumption and ownership are not local? In that case the law provides a
public good that is not geographically delimited. The product and ownership marketrelated benefits of the law are spread out across the country, and perhaps the globe. My
proposed measure of value does not capture these benefits. But it doesn’t seek to. Rather,
its goal is to provide a measure of the local, i.e., within-jurisdiction, welfare effects of the
law. This narrow scope does not insulate my measure from bias. That bias is proportional
to the share of the total product or ownership market occupied by the state that adopts the
law. To see this, start with the total non-delimited benefits of the law. The portion of
those benefits that fall within the state enacting the law is the fraction of the product and
ownership markets occupied by residents of that state. The portion of those benefits that
fall outside the state is the fraction of the product and ownership markets occupied by
non-residents. My measure cannot capture any of the non-delimited benefits of the law,
but is not concerned with any benefits that accrue to non-residents. That means the only
non-delimited benefits it cares about but cannot capture are those which accrue to
residents. And that is proportional to the size of the state’s share of the product and
ownership market, which is in turn roughly proportional to size of the state’s economy
relative to the rest of the country or the world. In other words, the bias is large for
California, but small for Georgia.
Importantly, this bias is limited by the extent to which higher productivity
increases consumer demand for the product. That demand will increase demand for local
workers. From this point on, then, the law can be treated as one which simply increases
local wages. Residents of state two will flock to state one to get higher paying jobs. They
will stop when their movement has bid up housing prices and partially bid down wages
44

This argument bears some resemblance to Posner’s argument for how firms dissipate the rents from a
government monopoly in their attempts to obtain that monopoly. Richard A Posner, The Social Costs of
Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 807 (1975). My argument is simply that one can track
individuals’ attempts to get locational rents by examining the housing and labor markets.
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such that the higher housing costs offset the wage gains from residing in state one. In
other words, any wage gain will be completely offset by a higher housing price.
Table 1 summarizes this analysis. If consumption and ownership of firms in the
affected product market are local, a law’s full effects are ultimately manifest in housing
and labor markets. If consumption and ownership are not local, then a portion of the
law’s effect is spread between the consumers (F1, due to lower prices) and owners (F2,
due to higher profits) in the affected product market that reside in (α) and outside (1-α)
the enacting state. It is the subset of these benefits that land in the enacting state (αF1 +
αF2) that my measure fails to capture. The remaining portion of the law’s effect is
manifest through local housing and labor markets (F3, due to increased demand). These
portions are affected by the following variables. The more competitive the product
market, the more the law will lower prices (F1) rather than raise profits (F2). The larger
the size of the enacting state, the larger the in-state effects (α) of the non-delimited law,
and the larger the bias. Finally, the more sensitive consumer demand is to price, the larger
is the portion of the law’s effect that is conveyed via higher labor demand to the housing
and labor markets.
Table 1. Distribution of benefits from laws that affect productivity by whether consumption and
ownership is local (bias highlighted in grey).
Local consumption
and ownership
Product market
Market for ownership
Housing and labor markets

Non-local consumption and/or ownership
In-state effects (α)
Out-of-state effects (1-α)
αF1 – not measured
(1-α)F1 – doesn’t count
αF2 – not measured
(1-α)F2 – doesn’t count
F3 = 1 – F1 – F2
0

1

Laws that affect product demand or labor supply can be analyzed just as laws that
affect production costs. A law that increases consumer demand, for example, will benefit
individuals in the same three ways as a law that lowers production costs. Although prices
will rise, they will not rise enough to capture all the additional utility reflected in the
increased demand, which will benefit individual consumers. The price rise and increased
demand will raise the profits of individual owners. Finally, firms will respond with
increased supply, which will increase demand for labor and thus attract non-residents
with the prospect of higher local wages.45 As before, the extent to which these effects are
45

A law that increases labor supply will drive down wages and lower the cost of production. This will
benefit individual owners of firms and, as this reduction in costs filters into a lower price, the individual
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captured in housing prices and wages depends primarily on the extent to which
consumption and ownership are local, and secondarily on the size of the enacting state
and whether supply is more or less sensitive to increases in price.
2. Laws that affect demand for housing
The second type of difficult law is one that directly affects the demand for
housing. For example, a more liberal homestead exemption may cause residents to hide
more of their worth in homes to protect that worth from creditors. Or a divorce law that
divides property according to fault might encourage a cheating husband to hide assets
from his wife by, among other things, not investing in their house.46 These are in fact
opposite sides of the same coin. In neither case does the housing and wages method fail.
Consider the exemption law first. There are two benefits of purchasing a house: a resident
protects his assets from creditors and gets utility from having a house. The cost is that the
resident is unable to purchase another product that provides greater utility than the
house.47 A person will buy a house in response to an increase in the homestead exemption
only if the benefits outweigh the costs:
Avoid loss to creditors + Value of house ≥ Value of other product
Now note three things. First, the value of the other product is greater than or equal to the
price of that other product. This is the case with all purchases: the anticipated value of the
product must be greater than or equal to the price of the product, or else the purchase is
irrational. Second, the price of the other product is equal to the amount the resident bids
on the house after the law. The reason is that the resident simply took money that was
going to be used on the other product and spent it on the house. Third, before the law is
passed, the most that the resident was willing to bid for the house is her value of the
house. For the marginal consumer, the value of the house is equal to the pre-law price of
the house. These points can be summarized as:

consumers of the firms’ products. This demand effect will cause an increase in quantity supplied, which
will raise demand for labor and thus the wage that enacting state firms offer.
46
I thank Doug Lichtman for this example.
47
This other expenditure could have been savings or investments, which are just proxies for future
consumption.
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Value of product ≥ price of product = post-law bid for house
Value of house = pre-law bid for house
If we plug these equations into the first equation, we see that a rational home purchase
must satisfy:
Avoid loss to creditors + Pre-law bid of house ≥ Post-law bid for house
Or, to put it another way, the asset-protection value of the home purchase must be greater
than the excessive amount the resident spent on the house:
Avoid loss to creditors ≥ Post-law bid for house – Pre-law bid of house
But the asset protection value is only available because of the exemption law, and the
change in bids is simply the change in price of housing. For the marginal resident these
values will be identical, i.e., the protective value of the law is equal to the increase in
housing prices. That is exactly my contention!
What about the divorce law case? How does my measure fare when, e.g., a
cheating husband hides assets from his wife after the state adopts a law that considers
fault when dividing marital property following a divorce? An obvious way to hide assets
is for the husband to reduce his investment in the couple’s house because that is an asset
easily traced by the wife. This will reduce housing prices. My welfare measure counts
this as a loss in value, though all that seems to have transpired is that wealth has been
transferred from the wife to the husband.
But appearances can be deceiving. The transaction at issue is not merely a transfer
from the wife to the husband, but also a loss of utility to both from having better housing.
For purposes of illustration, assume that the typical cheating husband stashes $100,000
that would have been spent on a house in a lock box, and that after he gets divorced – say
a year from now – he plans to spend the money on another house. In that case, housing
demand will fall to reflect that fact that the typical couple with a cheating husband is
getting one less year of a $100,000’s worth of housing. If housing supply is fixed, the
price drop will reflect exactly this loss of utility. The fall in price will not be the whole
$100,000 because the husband will reinvest the money in housing after the divorce.
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What if the money is invested rather than stored in a lock box? Even assuming the
alternative investment could not be traced by the wife, the investment, which would
increase the husband’s wealth after the divorce, merely exacerbates the wealth transfer.
Either the investment gains would have been split between husband and wife under nofault property settlement or kept by the husband under at-fault settlement. We do not
expect that the investment opportunity changes the marginal propensity to consume
housing, the reason being that it is available to the couple even if the husband does not
hide wealth from the wife.
The possibility that supply of housing is not fixed or that the husband might spend
less than $100,000 on housing post-divorce similarly makes little difference. If supply
falls with the decreased demand, price rises. This may reflect a slight increase in marginal
valuation, but will not reflect a serious change in aggregate valuation since the higher
price would be offset by lower quantity of housing. That the husband does not spend all
his hidden cash on housing after the couple separated is only a problem if the wife has a
higher marginal propensity to purchase housing with that money than the husband. In that
case the wife’s consumption would affect housing prices more than the husband’s,
though there is no reason to suspect that the cash transfer offers greater welfare to the
wife than the husband. I suspect, however, that the gap in marginal propensity to
consumer housing is a second- or even third-order effect.
If the reader remains skeptical, there is yet one more solution. Instead of looking
to housing prices (in addition to wages) to gauge welfare, look to rents. The effect of the
gaming by cheating husbands is much smaller among couples that rent because rental
expenses are not split upon divorce. Unless one believes that welfare effects of a divorce
law are actually different across property owners and renters, this will address any
qualms about gaming among owners.
3. Laws that give exclusively benefit longtime, pre-law residents
The last category of hard laws includes those that benefit only individuals who
lived in the state before the law was even anticipated. An example is a tax amnesty that
absolves filers of penalties on past-due taxes. Clearly one had to be a pre-law resident of
the state in order to have owed taxes. (Moreover, if the amnesty were announced before
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taxes were due, then it would not be an amnesty, but rather a law that lowers penalties on
future non-payment of tax.) These laws are difficult for my measure because migrants
cannot capture the benefits of the law. Therefore, they have no incentive to move to the
enacting state, driving up housing prices and down wages.48
These laws are reflected in a state’s housing prices only to the extent that existing
residents use the private proceeds from the law to increase their consumption of housing.
This will drive up the demand and thus prices for domestic housing.49 Yet this effect is
limited by residents’ marginal propensity to spend additional income on housing. If they
spend, say, only 10% of additional income on better housing, then housing prices will
pick up only 10% of the effect of the law. Yet even in this case, the effect will be offset
by changes in the labor market. The benefits from the law will reduce residents’ need to
work to earn any given level of income. They may respond consuming more leisure, i.e.,
by working less. This will drive up wages, which count as lower value under my
approach. One solution is to ignore wage effects when evaluating a category-three law.
But even then the estimate will be too low because people don’t spend every additional
dollar of income on housing. The better response is not to use my approach for laws that
only benefit long-time, pre-law residents.
C. How informative is housing and wages measure?
My thesis is that the housing and wages approach approximates the marginal
resident’s willingness to pay for a law. In this regard it is a second-best measure of the
local welfare effect of a law. The previous subsections offered some explanations for why
the measure is only an approximation; for example, it has difficulties with spillover
effects and with laws that exclusively benefit prior residents of a state. And in this section
will provide additional reasons why the method is not a first-best measure. More
importantly, however, this section will explain why the housing and wages approach is
nonetheless a better method than the conventional approach to valuing a law.

48

This is not the case if the law is anticipated. In that case migrants will move to the state before the law is
enacted. All that is required to value to the law is to examine housing prices after the law is anticipated but
before it is passed.
49
An implicit assumption is that, without some change in state two’s laws, a state-one resident will remain
in state one if she is looking for a bigger house.
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A first-best measure of welfare would tell us how much a law increased the utility
of all residents in a jurisdiction.50 The housing and wages approach does not attempt to
provide this sort of information. Rather it provides information on how much the
marginal migrant to a state values the law. This means that it ignores how much inframarginal residents value the law. These residents fall into two categories: post-law
residents who were also residents pre-law and individuals (other than the marginal
migrant) who moved to the enacting state post-law. Pre-law residents who remain in the
state all value the law at least as much as the marginal migrant. Otherwise they would
have sold their property to the marginal migrant and been better off in another state with
the cash proceeds and no law. Even if they did not own homes, they would have been
better off leaving because the rents would be sufficiently lower and the wages sufficiently
higher in other states to make the law not worth these lost opportunities. All post-law
migrants must also value the law at least as much as the marginal migrant. If they valued
the law less than the marginal migrant, the additional cost of housing and the lower
income offered in the enacting state would outweigh the private benefits they derived
from the law. The net implication is that the housing and wages approach offers a lower
bound on the first-best measure of welfare.51
That said, it is a better second-best measure than its competitors. These include
not only the conventional approach to valuing a law, which focuses on how the law
affects proximate behavior, but also other willingness-to-pay measures, such as the
number of post-law migrants to a state, the effect of a law on GDP or stock prices, the
tolerance for longer commutes to work among post-law residents, and surveys of
willingness-to-pay. Comparisons of different marginal willingness-to-pay measures can
be found elsewhere in the literature. I will only summarize my main concerns with these
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There is the question of whether one is interested in the welfare of residents within the state before the
law or after the law. Given that homeowners who leave the state capture some of the benefits of the law as
proceeds from home sales, and that all post-law migrants to the state value the law more than the residents
they displace, the ex-post measure provides some information on the ex-ante measure. This information is
confined, however, to the set of outward migrants.
51
To obtain this bound, simply multiply the marginal migrant’s willingness to pay by the number of
residents in the state, i.e., multiply the increase in housing prices by the number of houses, the increase in
rent by the number of rental units, and the increase in wages by the number of workers. The sum is a lower
bound on aggregate welfare effects.
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alternative measures and focus on comparing the housing and wages method to the
conventional approach for valuing a law.
The advantage of the housing and wages approach over counting the number of
migrants to the enacting state is that the latter may tell you the number of people that
prefer a law, but reveals nothing about the extent to which they prefer a law. The problem
with the GDP/stock price approach is that it does not capture the effect of laws that do
not affect productivity. The issue with commuting-time approach is that in the short-run it
may find little effect because the number of homes and the number of jobs is fixed.
Moreover, the magnitude of the effect depends on where new homes are built or new
factories are located. Better urban planning could lower the valuation of a law under this
approach. Finally, surveys of willingness-to-pay are wholly subjective and provide
respondents with little incentives to provide accurate answers.52
The more serious challenge to the housing and wages approach – or to be honest,
the more serious target of the proposed approach – is the conventional method of valuing
laws. This approach looks at the effect of a law on proximate behavior. For example, the
effect of truth-in-sentencing laws on violent and property crime rates53 or the effect of nofault and compulsory auto insurance laws on traffic fatalities.54 This approach does have
some benefits, but these are generally outweighed by the advantages of my proposed
approach.
One benefit of the conventional approach is that it provides a truly objective
measure of the effects of a law. In contrast, because migration is driven by individuals’
perceptions about the effect of a law, the housing and wages approach only captures an
objective manifestation of individuals’ subjective valuations of a law. Of course, welfare
is driven by subjective valuation; otherwise the expressive effect of a law has no value.
Moreover, subjective valuations are based on residents’ observations and thus reflect
objective realities. One can be as confident in the objectivity of the housing and wages
approach as one is confident in rational expectations. But the real tradeoff on this issue –
52

Anup Malani and Tomas Philipson, Measurement Errors: A Principal Investigator-Agent Approach, 91 J.
Econometrics 273 (1999).
53
Joanna M. Shepherd, Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate Sentencing: The Truth About
Truth-In-Sentencing Laws, 45 J. Law & Econ. 509 (2002).
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J. David Cummins, Richard D. Phillips, and Mary A Weis, The Incentive Effects of No-Fault
Automobile Insurance, 44 J. Law & Econ. 427 (2001); Alma Cohen and Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of
Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J. Law & Econ. 357 (2004).
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the one that tips the scales in favor of the housing and wages method – concerns the
scope of effects that the two approaches capture. The conventional approach only
captures objectively those effects that investigators can identify and measure. It does not
capture, for example, unpredictable benefits or benefits that are difficult to observe or
quantify. The housing and wages approach can.
Unpredictable benefits can be very important. A good example is the connection
between abortion and crime. For quite some time, people did not examine the effect of
permitting legal abortions on crime rates. (While I do not mean to justify abortion rights
on this ground, it would be hard to contend that the fall in crime is not a benefit in some
sense.) The reason was that until a few really creative scholars thought about it, the
theoretical connection was not made. An advantage of the housing and wages approach is
that creativity is not required for abortion rights to be credited for their effects on crime.
Lower crime would have driven up housing prices. The fact that this would have
occurred in states with more liberal abortion rights means that housing prices would be
positively correlated with more liberal abortion rights.
Benefits that are difficult to measure include expressive benefits and enforcement
costs. An example is Megan’s law, which requires sex offenders to register with a state
when they move there. Such a law might deter sex offenders from moving to a state or
allow the state to assign police to monitor offenders, which in turn will reduce sex
offenses. These might plausibly be estimated via the conventional approach.55 But a
registration law might also make other residents less anxious about sex offenders in their
community or allow these residents to express their outrage against sex offenders. These
effects are very hard to quantify and employ under the conventional method; I know of
no variable that captures placebo effects or expressive values.56 On the other hand the law
might be very costly to administer in obvious and non-obvious ways. Registration may

55

See, e.g., Elizabeth Lovell, Megan's law: does it protect children? A review of evidence on the impact of
community notification as legislated for through Megan's law in the United States; Recommendations for
policy makers in the United Kingdom (2001). For a summary of findings, see http://www.nspcc.org.uk
/Inform/Research/Findings/MegansLaw_asp_ifega26197.html. See also Thomas J. Miles, Community
Notification and the Sentencing of Sex Offenders, Working Paper, University of Chicago, September 2003.
56
Perhaps one could use levels of happiness from the General Social Survey, but that is very rough
measure and the outcomes are hard to interpret. For example, what does mean it for welfare to find that
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require costly computer systems and public notices. Enforcement of the registration
obligations may eat up scarce police resources; so might the fact that knowing one’s
neighbor is a sex offender might cause one to file more police complaints about
suspicious behavior by the neighbor for any given level of sex offenses he commits. Any
criminologist will tell you that all these costs are very hard to measure directly. But that
is not a problem for the housing and wages approach.57 Housing prices and wages will
capture placebo effects, expressive values and enforcement costs because people take
these factors into account when they move.
Another benefit of the conventional approach is that it can identify the pathway
through which a law operates. For example, it is has been reported that wrongfuldischarge laws have had a small but significant effect on the level of employment.58 But
perhaps more significant is the fact that they have changed the nature or terms of
employment, by causing an expansion of employment at temp agencies.59 It is the
conventional approach that was used to tease out these effects. The housing and wages
approach, in its simplest form, would simply lump these different effects together. The
offsetting advantage, however, is that my approach provides a better estimate of welfare.
While the conventional approach tells us that wrongful-discharge laws may reduce the
level and terms of employment, it does not tell us how important those effects are to
welfare. What are people willing to pay for a one to two percent decrease in
unemployment, given that they are also more likely to be working at a temp agency
without health benefits? Who knows? But with the housing and wages approach one can
answer this question. It is possible to identify the amount that the marginal resident is
giving up to have the protection of a wrongful discharge law by examining how much
more she is willing to pay for housing and how much less she is willing to earn.
What’s more, this approach can be combined with the conventional approach to
determine both welfare effects and pathways of causation. For example, if you want to
57
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discover the welfare implications of the effect of a wrongful-discharge law on temporary
employment, simply regress housing prices and wages once on the wrongful-discharge
law, and once on the law and the temporary employment level in the state. The
coefficient on the law in the first regression would provide an estimate of the welfare
impact of the law, including all effects of the law. The coefficient on the law in the
second regression would provide an estimate of the welfare impact of the law excluding
its effect on temporary employment. The difference in the coefficients on the wrongfuldischarge law across the two regressions would provide an estimate of the welfare
implications of changes in temporary employment.
A weakness that the housing and wages approach has vis-à-vis the conventional
approach is that it implicitly weights an individual’s welfare in proportion to her wealth.60
The reason is that it relies on a market measure of value – housing prices – and market
prices weight individuals’ preferences in proportion to their income. To see this, suppose
two individuals with identical income have the same valuation (and thus bid) for a house.
If the first individual is magically given a small amount of additional income, she will
raise her bid for the house for no other reason than that she has more disposable income
with which to bid. Because she will be able to outbid the second individual, her bid will
determine the house’s ultimate sale price. Therefore, any approach that employs housing
prices to estimate the value of a law will weight wealthier residents more.
A partial solution is possible if one has data on the income or wealth of residents.
In that case the regression analysis can weight each observation on a resident in inverse
proportion to the income of that resident. This will cause the estimate of welfare effects
to weight the preferences of lower income residents the same as those of higher income
residents. However, the solution is only partial if the law has a larger effect on higher
income individuals, e.g., a medical malpractice targeted tort reform. In that case the
inverse-of-income weighting scheme will underplay the welfare effects of the law on the
higher income population.
But this weakness is surely overcome by one of the primary benefits of housing
and wages approach: the ability to compare different types of laws.
60
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A more technical way to put this is that the housing and wages approach implicitly assumes each
person’s weight in the social welfare function is proportional to her lifetime wealth given complete credit
markets.
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conventional approach would have trouble comparing, e.g., a law banning concealed
weapon and a school-choice law (how would one compare a law that affects mortality
rates with a law that affects test scores?), my approach would have no difficulty doing so.
The reason is that my approach examines the effect of all laws on the same two
outcomes. This permits a direct comparison of laws that have entirely different
objectives, let alone pathways. A ban on concealed weapons would be better for welfare
than a school-choice law if on net it raised housing prices and lowered wages more.
Indeed, in certain cases this benefit can overcome the primary weakness of the
housing and wages approach: the ability only to identify effects on the marginal migrant
to state one, not the effects on the average resident or all residents after passage of the
law. So long as the two laws being compared do not have any effects on the supply curve
for housing and the demand curve for labor, then the ratio of the effects of the two laws
on the marginal resident will equal the ratio of the effects of the two laws on the average
resident or all residents. This benefit does not extend to analysis of, e.g., zoning laws or
to workplace safety laws, but it does extend to, e.g., criminal laws, educational reforms,
voting rights laws, and so on.
A difficulty might nonetheless arise if the distributional effects of the two laws
differed, i.e., if the first law helped the poor more than the second. Even though the net
effect of the first law might be greater than the second given equal weighting of each
person’s utility, a naive application of the housing and wages approach might find that
the second law was better than the first. Where one suspects important distributional
consequences, however, there is an adjustment that can be made to account for these
effects. Specifically, the investigator should divide the sample of homes and jobs into
bins representing higher and lower wealth populations. For example, single family homes
or apartments with more than five rooms have higher income residents and jobs in
management or professional services tend to have higher wealth workers. Then the
investigator should estimate the effect of the laws separately on each bin. If there is a
distributional effect that favors the wealthy, the law should increase the housing prices or
rents and lower the wage of individuals in high-wealth bins more than those of
individuals in low-wealth bins.
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Finally, there are two shortcomings of the housing and wages approach for which
there are no related offsetting benefits. All that can be argued is that these shortcomings
are second-order in terms of magnitude. The first flaw is that the method does not capture
the effect of laws on individuals who are not in the housing or labor market. This
includes, e.g., prisoners, members of the armed forces, and children. If these individuals
are residing in state two when state one passes a law they like, they cannot move to show
their preference for it. Of course a child’s parents may consider her welfare and move,
and we can try to rationalize that prisoners don’t deserve to be in the social welfare
function. But at the end of the day, these folks are under-counted by my method.
The second flaw is that the measure fails to control for what economists call
income effects. Suppose state one passes a law that makes individuals happier. After the
law, housing prices will rise and wages will fall. Although migrants to state one will have
higher utility, they will suffer a loss of disposable income. That loss will have a secondorder effect on consumption of housing and leisure. Because consumption of housing
generally rises with income, i.e., housing is a normal good, the feedback effect will
reduce demand for housing and thus the price of housing. The effect on wages is unclear.
On the one hand, a decrease in wages will cause a substitution towards more productive
uses of time, namely leisure. This will tend to increase wages because it lowers labor
supply. One the other hand, the initial decrease in wages will reduce consumption of
leisure, which is also a normal good. That will increase labor supply and thus lower
wages. The problem is that the housing and wages approach captures these feedback
effects, even though they do not reflect value from the law, but rather residents’
adjustments to drawing value from the law. The consolation is that the adjustment effects
on housing prices and wages will be minor relative to direct-value effects because they
are mediated by residents’ marginal propensity to consume housing and leisure. These
propensities are significantly less than one, i.e., a dollar increase in income will produce
much less than a dollar change in expenditure on housing and leisure. This is not just
because the budget constraint (can’t buy a $2 toy with just $1 dollar), but because studies
by economists have shown this to be the case. To summarize, while the income effect
will make the housing and wages approach a less accurate approximation of the marginal
resident’s willingness to pay for a law, the additional error is not very large.
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III.

Political economy considerations
Even if they are persuaded by many of the points I made in the previous section,

scholars of political economy and local government may continue to have important
reservations about the housing and wage approach. In this section I attempt to address
these concerns.
The first concern is that truly local laws – those at the municipal level – are often
enacted with an eye towards local trends in property values. At least this is the hypothesis
of William Fischel in his book, The Homevoter Hypothesis.61 His claim – not entirely
uncontroversial62 – is that property owners are more likely to participate in local elections
than renters. The reason is that willingness to pay for laws is incorporated into local land
prices, which impact property owners more than renters. Indeed, local property owners
will “punish” local officials by voting them out of office if the latter’s policies lower the
former’s asset values.63 The implication is that local officials will formulate local laws to
stem falling land prices or to raise law prices. The implication for my analysis is that
statistical correlations between housing prices and local laws cannot be taken to imply
causation from the laws to housing prices. There is a serious danger than local politics
cause local land prices to “cause” local laws to be adopted and that this reverse causation
may cloud the sought-after effect of laws on land prices. Economists call this selection
bias or endogeneity bias.
Whether or not Fischel is correct, the objection must be taken seriously. One
solution is to apply the standard methods of addressing selection: testing if falling land
prices in one year predict adoption of local laws in the following year, employment of
political covariates to control for selection due to the homevoter hypothesis, or the
employment of an instrumental variable for the legal change. But one cannot count on
these approaches working in all cases. Therefore, I accept that the housing and wage
approach may be less accurate when evaluating local government-level laws than when
evaluating state-level laws. I draw a line between local government laws and state laws
because Fischel does. In his view, the political economy story behind the homevoter
61
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hypothesis is does not apply at the state level because state laws have much more
dispersed effects on property values, lessening the relative incentive of property owners
to participate in elections, and because the connection between state laws and local
representatives to the state legislature is so attenuated that local voters do not hold these
representatives responsible for adverse state laws.64
A second political economy-motivated concern with the housing and wage
approach is really a question about the equilibrating process discussed in Section I.A:
why do state-two residents that prefer state one’s new law move rather than simply
lobbying for passage of the same law in state two? If state-two residents respond by
lobbying rather than moving, then there will be no change in relative housing price or
wage between states one and two. There are two reasons, however, to doubt that statetwo residents are more likely to lobby than to move. First, it is cheaper for the marginal
individual or family to move between states than to lobby successfully. Lobbying is a
very expensive endeavor, moving costs are much smaller. Second, lobbying is subject to
collective action problems because the preferred law is a public good. Moving almost
exclusively benefits the mover.
That said, the state-two resident that prefers state one’s new law but prefers state
two’s remaining laws – the infra-marginal state-two resident – will not move and may
decide it worthwhile to engage in lobbying. (Indeed, it would be hard otherwise to
explain lobbying in particular and legal changes more broadly.) In that case state two
may mimic state one by also adopting the new law in question. This possibility highlights
an important limitation of the housing and wage approach: it only identifies changes in
willingness-to-pay to the extent that they affect the relative price of housing or wages
across jurisdictions. To illustrate the limitation, consider the following example. Suppose
everyone prefers a strong criminal law against child molesters, though some prefer it
more than others. If the law is adopted only in state one, parents who most strongly prefer
the law may move to state one, raising housing prices and lower wages in state one
relative to housing prices and wages, respectively, in state two. If the law is adopted in
both state one and state two, however, all parents – including those that moved in the
counterfactual – can remain where they are and enjoy the law. Because there is no
64
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migration, the relative prices of housing and wages remain the same. Yet it would be
incorrect to conclude that the new law did not raise welfare. The larger implication is that
the more responsive state laws are to the preferences of its residents, the less the housing
and wage approach will capture the welfare benefits of laws. As is the case with regard to
other limitations of the approach, however, it may still be employed to assess the relative
effects of two different laws so long as one does not believe the political system is more
responsive to the supporters of one of the laws than the other.
IV.

Empirical example.
I imagine that a significant remaining source of skepticism about my claim is

concern that housing price and wage data are too noisy to permit identification of the
effect of a legal change. The purpose of this section is to take a step towards easing that
concern. What follows is an evaluation of a series of laws according to the housing and
wages method. Each of the laws has previously been evaluated employing conventional
methods and I will reference prior studies in order to highlight the potential, practical
contributions of my method. Readers should, however, not view my findings as
definitive. The narrow purpose of this exercise below is to demonstrate that excess noise
does not handicap my methodology relative to the proximate behavior methodology
employed in prior studies, and not to correct statistical problems such as selection
common to both methodologies. Therefore, the reader should take seriously not the
coefficients themselves, but rather the differences between my coefficient estimates and
those from prior studies.
A. Data
Housing prices. Data on housing prices were drawn from the national version of the
American Housing Survey (AHS). This survey is conducted by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). It includes roughly 50,000 housing units per
year. The survey was conducted annually from 1973 – 1981, and bi-annually after that.65
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My sample excludes the year 1973 because the data on numerous covariates are missing
for that year.
The AHS-National survey provides three measures of housing price. For housing
units that are owned by the occupant, one measure is the occupant’s subjective estimate
of a housing unit’s value.66 Another is the price at which (and the date on which) the
occupant acquired the housing unit. For housing units that are rented by the occupant, the
AHS reports the monthly rental price. Presently, my analysis only employs the subjective
owner’s assessment of value as a proxy for housing prices. I do not use purchase price
because the survey does not report housing characteristics for the year a property was
acquired, but rather for the year that the occupant was surveyed.
The housing characteristics I extract from the AHS are those typically employed in
environmental or urban economic studies that attempt to value environmental amenities
such as clear air or urban amenities such as a professional sports stadium.67 Occasionally
I omit important variables, such as lot size or square footage, when the cost they impose
in terms of reduced sample size outweigh what I subjectively assess to be their
explanatory power. The latter assessment is significantly influenced by the existence of
alternative variables, such as number of rooms and height of building, that have fewer
missing observations and are workable proxies for the initial variables.
Wages. Data on wages were drawn from the March version of the Current Population
Survey (CPS). The CPS gathers data on roughly 200,000 workers per year. These
workers are interviewed once a month for four consecutive months, then left alone for
eight months, then interviewed again once a month for four consecutive months. Only
twice, in the fourth and eighth interviews, are workers asked about their hourly or weekly
wages. If the fourth or eighth interview happens to occur in March, it will be included in
my current sample.68 For some reason, some workers are asked their hourly wage and
others are asked their weekly wage. The worker characteristics I extract from the CPS are
66
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those typically employed in labor economics studies examining disparities in wages.
Because the CPS only asked workers about their weekly or hourly wage starting in 1979,
my wage sample starts that year. Because certain crucial worker characteristic variables
have not been released for 2004 data, my wage sample ends in 2003.
Laws. In order to facilitate a comparison of the housing and wages approach with the
conventional approach, I gather data on laws from prior studies that employ the
conventional method. These include data on:
•
•
•

•
•
•

Medical malpractice-related tort reforms from Jonathan Klick and Thomas Stratmann,
“Does Medical Malpractice Reform Help States Retain Physicians and Does It
Matter?,” working paper (Nov. 2005)
Tort reforms from Paul Rubin and Joanna Shepherd, “Tort Reform and Accidental
Deaths,” working paper (2005)
Abortion rights laws from Jonathan Klick, “Mandatory Waiting Periods for Abortions
and Female Mental Health,” Health Matrix (forthcoming, 2006); and Jonathan Klick
and Thomas Stratmann, “Abortion Access Laws and Risky Sex Among Teens:
Parental Involvement Laws and Sexually Transmitted Diseases,” working paper (Oct.
2005)
No-fault automobile insurance laws from RAND
Divorce laws from Leora Friedberg, “Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates:
Evidence from Panel Data, 88 Amer. Econ. Rev. 608 (1998)
Health insurance mandates from Jonathan Klick and Sara Markowitz, “Are Mental
Health Insurance Mandates Effective?: Evidence from Suicides,” Health Econ.
(forthcoming, 2006); Jonathan Klick and Thomas Stratmann, “Subsidizing Addiction:
Do State Health Insurance Mandates Increase Alcohol Consumption?,” J. Legal Stud.
(forthcoming 2006); and Jonathan Klick and Thomas Stratmann, “Diabetes
Treatments and Moral Hazard,” Florida State University Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 05-21 (Aug. 2005)

The law data are merged with housing and wages data by state. Since the housing data
are sorted by metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and an MSA may cover more than one
state, I matched MSAs to states based on which state has the largest population within the
MSA.69
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the housing and wage data sets. Statistics
are computed separated for each dependent variable because there may be different
numbers of homes and workers with non-missing observations on the dependent variable
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in the AHS and the CPS data sets. Figures 2 – 7 graph the number of states that have each
type of law by year.
B. Empirical model
The empirical model I employ resembles the standard model in empirical law and
economics studies:
yijt = βXijt + μj + λt + γtj + αLjt + εijt
where i, j and t index individuals, jurisdictions, and time, respectively; y is housing price,
rent, hourly wage or weekly wage; X is a vector of housing or wage characteristics as
appropriate; μj is an jurisdiction-fixed effect; λt is a time-fixed effect; tj is a vector of
jurisdiction-specific time trends; and L is a vector of state law variables. The jurisdiction
for house price and rent data is the MSA; it is the state for the CPS data. This model
employs a differences-in-difference estimator to identify the effect of state laws on
housing prices or wages.
C. Interpretation of preliminary results
Tables 3 – 9 present the results of my preliminary regression analyses. Before I
discuss my findings, let me comment on the problem of endogeneity, i.e., the problem
that correlation might pick up the effect of welfare on laws rather than laws on welfare.
Although it may appear that I have a plausible argument for why my analysis does not
suffer endogeneity (surely the laws I examine were not adopted because of shifts in
housing prices or wages), that impression is incorrect. Whatever causes conventional
analysis to suffer endogeneity bias, also causes my approach to suffer endogeneity bias.
The extent of bias is proportional to how sensitive housing prices and wages are to the
outcomes studied in conventional analyses.
For example, a concern with studies of the effect of tort reform on the number of
physicians in a state is that a shortage of physicians may cause a state to adopt tort
reforms to attract more physicians. This would lead to a negative correlation between tort
reform and physician population, which could mask the predicted positive effects of tort
reform on the physician population that motivated the reform in the first place. My
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analysis of tort reform is not entirely immune to this problem. A shortage of physicians
will depress housing prices and encourage the state to adopt tort reforms; the result is a
negative correlation between tort reform and housing prices. But that could mask the
positive effect that tort reform would have on the physician population, which should
increase housing prices.
Fortunately, there is a partial solution. If the investigator were to add the
conventional outcome that raises concerns about the endogeneity of a law as an
explanatory variable to the housing and wage regression analysis, she would be able to
estimate the effect of the law on welfare exclusive of endogenous channels. This is
valuable so long as one does not suspect that welfare effects through non-endogenous
channels are negatively related to welfare effects through endogenous channels. So, for
example, if housing prices were regressed upon tort reform and the physician population,
then the effect one would find would capture the effect of tort reform on welfare due the
effect of tort reform on outcomes – such as the number of uninsured70 and the amount of
defensive medicine71 – other than physician population.
Table 3 presents the results of my analysis employing tort reform variables
employed by Jonathan Klick and Thomas Stratmann in a paper that examines the effect
of such reforms on the supply of physicians in a state. Focusing on statistically significant
results, Klick and Stratmann found that caps on non-economic damages and the
elimination of joint and several liability tended to increase physician supply.72 Given that
greater physician supply is thought to be good for welfare, one would expect that these
reforms raise housing prices and lower wages. I find, however, that these reforms do not
have statistically significant effects on housing or wages. This could be because, once
one considers the implications of these reforms on outcomes other than physician supply,
the effects are not clearly positive for welfare. More interestingly, I find that caps
specifically on damages in medical malpractice cases tend significantly to lower rents,
housing prices, and wages. Looking just at rents and weekly wages, and accounting for
70
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the fact that on average there are 1.05 employed occupants per rental unit in my sample
and that the average month has 4.16 work weeks,73 it appears that the wage effect offsets
the rental effect such that the net effect on welfare is a gain of $27.30 per worker. (Nonworkers, however, tend to lose roughly $47 per person under the law.)
The skeptical reader might wonder whether the rental effect is too large to be
credible. Forty-seven dollars is nearly half the value I estimate for a full bathroom. I
avoid focusing on the housing price effects of medical malpractice caps for a similar
reason: a $12,000 effect appears too large given that the average home in my sample is
worth $99,700.74 I suspect a part of the problem is that the measure of housing values in
the AHS is not very precise. It is the owner’s own assessment of the value of his or her
property. (For this reason, I do not take too seriously my finding that eliminating the
collateral source rule, which bars defendants from introducing evidence to show that the
plaintiff has already been compensated for part of her injuries by, e.g., a health insurer,
increased housing prices.) But the rental data from the AHS is much more objective;
while based on self-reports, those reports are of a recurring monthly payment almost
surely known with precision by the occupant. Another explanation of the large effects
might be that my tort reform variables are picking up the effects of other laws for which I
do not control. I will explore this possibility in Table 10.
Table 4 presents results that employ tort reform data from Paul Rubin and Joanna
Shepherd’s recent working paper on the effects of these reforms on non-motor vehicle
accident rates. Their conclusion – which they stress to me is preliminary – is that, with
the exception of reforms to the collateral source rule, tort reforms tend to lower death
rates.75 I would expect, then, that such reforms should raise rents and lower wages. I find
the opposite. Caps on punitive damages tend to lower rents and caps in product liability
cases tend to raise hourly wages. The latter effect might be explained by the fact that
businesses prefer to locate in states with a less aggressive tort environment; this raises the
demand for and thus price of labor. Because firms do not count in the social welfare
73

4.16 weeks/month = 50 weeks/12 months.
Since the housing sample starts in 1974 and the tort reform subsample starts in 1980, it is likely that the
average price tort reform sample is higher. That would make the medical malpractice effect more credible.
75
The theory they suggest is that tort liability makes new products, which include greater tort insurance but
are also safer, more expensive. Therefore, such liability discourages consumers from buying newer, safer
versions of goods.
74

37

function (only individuals do), this explanation does not imply that caps in product
liability cases improve welfare. However, the possibility that tort reform could have
positive spillover effects in the form of improving profits of business owners who need
not reside in the reform state, suggests that my estimates should be interpreted only as a
local measure of welfare.
Table 5 examines the effect of laws that regulate access to abortion. The data on
these laws was taken from papers by Klick and Stratmann. In one, Klick finds that
mandatory waiting periods tend to lower female suicides, while restrictions on Medicaid
funding of abortions tends to increase female suicides. Perhaps the theory is that waiting
periods give a woman the opportunity for contemplation before taking an action that may
have lingering, harmful psychological effects; but once a woman makes a considered
decision to have an abortion, blocking that abortion with restrictions on funding may
have its own lingering, harmful psychological consequences. Whatever the rationale, my
findings are roughly consistent with the Klick study. I find that housing values rise with
mandatory waiting periods and fall with restrictions on funding. I do not put very much
weight on these results: the magnitudes are implausible and my housing values are
subjective. Moreover, it appears that when a waiting period law is enjoined, both rents
and housing values rise.
In a separate paper with Stratmann, Klick finds that parental notification laws
reduced gonorrhea infections among teenage females. While some of my findings are
consistent with that paper (notification laws raise rents by $35), others cast doubt upon it
(rents rise $14 when notification laws are enjoined). Perhaps my inconsistent findings can
be reconciled either by adding them, which would suggest a net positive effect of roughly
$21, or by hypothesizing that people prefer these laws until courts provide new
information that the laws impede the right to privacy under the state or federal
constitution.76
Table 6 reports the effects of no-fault automobile liability laws. The data were
acquired from RAND. Studies by David Cummins, Richard Phillips, and Mary Weis and
by Alma Cohen and Rajeev Dehejia have found that no-fault liability laws tend to
76
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increase traffic fatalities (theoretically, for the same reasons that tort liability might
reduce accidents). When I formulate no-fault laws as a 0/1 indicator variable (one if there
is a no-fault law), I find no significant effects on rents or wages. However, in an
unreported analysis, I do find significant negative effects on rents when I formulate the
law as the threshold below which accident costs are allocated without regard to fault.
(This is consistent with results reported in Cummins et al.)
Table 7 examines the effect of different types of divorce law. The data are drawn
from Leora Friedberg’s previous work, which found that unilateral divorce, with or
without property division based on fault, led to greater numbers of divorces.77 Betsey
Stevenson and Justin Wolfers used these same data to determine the effect of divorce
laws on domestic violence. They found that unilateral divorce laws significantly reduced
husband-on-wife violence and wife-on-husband severe violence. Stevenson and Wolfers’
results, if not Friedberg’s result, suggests that unilateral divorce should raise rents and
lower wages. I find the welfare effects are mixed. Wages fall (by $4-18 per week), but so
do rents (by roughly $18, regardless of whether property division remains subject to
fault). The overall welfare effect is positive and significant for no-fault property division,
but virtually zero for at-fault property division. What’s more, falling rents suggest people
are leaving states with unilateral divorce, but the wage effect suggest that firms are
staying. That is hard to explain (why should firms care about divorce laws?). Perhaps
there is a shift in the composition of workers – low wage workers leave, high skilled
remain. It remains for me to test this hypothesis by computing the aggregate wage effect
of the unilateral divorce law. That effect is the change in total wage bill – wages times
workers – before and after the law.
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unilateral divorce does not appear to increase divorce rates.
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Table 878 considers the effect of health insurance mandates on local welfare. The
two mandates studied are requirements that health insurance companies provide coverage
for diabetes therapies and that such companies provide coverage for mental health
problems on par with their coverage of physical health problems. The latter are called
mental health parity laws. In two separate papers, Klick and Stratmann find that diabetes
mandates increased the body-mass index (BMI) of diabetics and that mental health parity
laws increased alcohol consumption. They interpret these as examples of moral hazard
induced by mandatory insurance. My analysis finds that diabetes mandates increased
rents but lowered housing values. (Mental health parity laws had no significant effects.)
One interpretation is that the rent regression is more trustworthy and the mandates appear
to have increased welfare. The reason is that moral hazard is only clearly a cost to the
principal; it is a short-run and perhaps even a long-run gain to the agent. Another
interpretation is that there are distributional consequences of mandates. Occupants in
rental units benefited while homeowners suffered. The reason could be that the former
are poorer and sicker and were likely to have benefited from medical care whose cost was
borne predominantly by the latter, who are richer and healthier. The explanation that is
most appealing will depend on how skeptical the reader is of my measure of home values.
Table 9 is a first stab at the problem of spurious correlation in studies that
examine only one type of law. The risk is that, because laws are enacted in groups, one
law might appear to have an effect on housing prices that is really due to another,
unaccounted-for law. One suspects this possibility when a law has unbelievably large
effects on a given outcome. An example is medical malpractice caps in Table 3. In order
to check whether this is a serious concern, I estimated a regression model that includes
78

In the interests of full disclosure, a previous version of this paper included analysis of the effect of
executions on housing prices and wages for purposes of evaluation the death penalty. (In short, I found that
executions tended to increase rents by $0.25 per execution. The rent effect minus the wage effect, however,
was not significant). That analysis is omitted from this draft for two reasons. First, the initial analysis did
not include the full and usual panoply of crime law control variables (e.g., unemployment rate,
demographic composition of population, etc.). Second, John Donohue and Justin Wolfers, in a recent
working paper, argue persuasively that there is too little variation in the execution data to precisely estimate
the effect of the death penalty. See John J. Donohue III and Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical
Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, working paper (2006). A partial response to their criticism in the
housing context is that additional precision in estimating the effect of executions may be possible in the
housing and wage context because those data are disaggregated from the state to individual house or
worker level and there are individual house and worker level covariates. The response is incomplete,
however, because the size of the disaggregated effect is much smaller than the aggregated state level effect,
so some of the reduction in standard error will be offset by a smaller coefficient.
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Rubin and Shepherd’s tort reform data, no-fault auto liability laws, and health insurance
mandates as treatment variables all at once.79 To facilitate comparison with estimates
from regression models that examine each set of laws separately, Table 9 reproduces the
appropriate regression results from prior tables in its first four columns. The results of the
combined regressions are in the last four columns. The most optimistic finding (from a
methodological perspective) is that caps on punitive damages reduce rents and executions
and diabetes mandates increase rents in both separate and combined regressions.
Moreover, caps in product liability cases tend to increase hourly wages across the
models. This should increase one’s confidence that the specified tort reforms reduce local
welfare and that executions and diabetes mandates increase local welfare.
V.

Conclusion
A natural subject on which to conclude is the implications of my proposal for the

normative analysis of law. To what extent should the housing and wage approach be
employed to recommend policies and legal rules to government officials and courts? As
much as I would like to stress that, in my view, this paper should only be taken as a tool
for positive analysis of the welfare effects of laws, a natural use for such a tool is to
support normative claims about what laws are good for society and which are not. In light
of this danger, I ask advocates and policymakers to be cautious about employing my
proposal to judge laws in cases where they fear that the law appeals to preferences that
they want not to weight or want to discourage. Most obviously these include racist or
sexist preferences. The housing and wage approach weighs illegitimate preferences and
otherwise legitimate preferences equally. Therefore, if one is concerned, for example,
that support for a criminal law is significantly motivated by residents’ belief and desire
that it will disproportionately affect young black males, then the housing and wage
approach will not give an accurate measure of the “legitimate” welfare effect of the law.
That said, even with this exclusion, I believe that the approach can be employed for
evaluate a large number of laws because there are many that do not rely on illegitimate
preferences for support.

79

This regression also included as covariates the number of executions per state. For an explanation, see
supra note 78.
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Figure 3: Tort reforms (Rubin/Shepherd)
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Figure 4: Abortion laws (Klick/Stratmann)
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Figure 5: Auto liability (RAND)
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Figure 6: Divorce laws (Friedberg)
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Figure 8: Health laws (Klick/Stratmann)
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Table 2. Summary statistics.

Variable
Rent/Value ($)
Age (yr)
Full baths (#)
Bedrooms ($)
Garage/parking (0/1)
Low rise (0/1)
High rise (01)
Holes in floor (0/1)
Hous. quality raitng (1-10)
Kitchen (0/1)
Rooms (0/1)
Rent controlled (0/1)
Married (0/1)
Children (#)
Black head of hhd (0/1)

Variable
Wage ($)
Age (yr)
Union member (0/1)
Job has pension (0/1)
Employer contributes
to health insur. (0/1)
High school grad (0/1)
College grad (0/1)
Married (0/1)
White (0/1)
Hispanic (0/1)
Veteran (0/1)

Rent regression
Obs.
Mean
210590
370.52
210590
31.07
208161
1.11
210589
1.76
191927
0.33
208036
0.83
208036
0.17
200874
0.03
196168
7.22
210590
0.96
210590
4.03
210590
0.03
210590
0.24
210590
0.61
210590
0.66

Std. Dev.
289.02
20.25
0.34
0.91
0.47
0.38
0.38
0.16
2.26
0.19
1.39
0.17
0.42
1.11
0.47

Hourly wage regessions
Obs.
Mean
206307
8.75
206307
35.98
206307
0.14
198045
0.40

Std. Dev.
5.66
13.50
0.35
0.49

198045
206307
206307
206307
206307
206307
206307

1039.65
0.70
0.11
0.55
0.96
0.09
0.13

1412.24
0.46
0.31
0.50
0.20
0.28
0.33

Housing regression
Obs.
Mean
259656
99702.57
259656
29.51
248019
1.44
259656
2.97
245189
0.62
239336
0.94
239336
0.06
256441
0.01
250592
8.41
259656
0.99
259656
6.21
259656
259656
259656

Std. Dev.
103861.40
19.18
0.59
0.86
0.48
0.24
0.24
0.08
1.68
0.12
1.62

0.50
0.79
0.84

0.50
1.17
0.37

Weekly wage regressions
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
298809
447.05
379.76
298809
37.44
13.10
298809
0.14
0.35
290556
0.46
0.50
290556
298809
298809
298809
298809
298809
298809

1316.57
0.63
0.22
0.59
0.96
0.08
0.13

1619.08
0.48
0.41
0.49
0.20
0.27
0.33

Notes. Summary statistics are unweighted. Rental and housing data span 1974-2003 (only biannually after 1981).
Wage data span 1979-2003. A significant fraction of observations are dropped in subsequent regressions because
law data are only available for subsets of these dates.
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Table 3. Tort reform from Klick and Stratmann.

Specification

K&S Tab.
3

Rental

Housing

Wage

Wage

Dependent variable

Docs/100k
pop

Monthly
rent

Value

Hourly
wage

Weekly
wage

0.049
(0.08)
-0.288*
(0.15)
-0.016
(0.10)
0.158*
(0.09)
0.085
(0.10)
-0.015
(0.09)
0.091
(0.13)

-2.361
(3.37)
17.506***
(4.58)
-2.462
(4.55)
5.216
(4.52)
8.892
(5.91)
3.488
(4.62)
6.826
(8.81)

19801997
156201
0.45

19801997
220410
0.54

Non-econ
damages cap

1.652
(0.74)

Med mal cap

1.917
(1.50)
-0.619
(0.51)
1.612
(0.64)
0.432
(0.73)
-1.299
(0.56)
-1.385
(1.20)

No collateral source
rule
No joint & several
liability
Cap on contingency
fees
Madated periodic
payments
Victim's fund

Date range
Observations
R-Squared

**

**

**

-3.77
(8.38)
-47.77
(19.82)
-0.20
(10.05)
10.61
(9.14)
8.08
(10.77)
-6.59
(8.34)
-18.47
(13.89)
19801997
87648
0.55

**

2051.72
(4662.99)
12216.32
(4524.56)
9491.70
(4585.36)
5475.74
(3911.24)
-957.45
(5319.17)
-1152.45
(3601.40)
-5542.04
(3421.01)
19801997
90309
0.54

***
**

Notes for other studies. In general the coefficient that is reported was selected based on similarity
between empirical model behind that coefficient and the empirical model in this study. This
implies a preference for OLS estimates (without correction for endogeneity) and empirical models
with year- and state-fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends. Where multiple coefficient
estimates satisfy these criteria, the one stressed by a studies’ authors as most accurate is
reported.
Notes for last four columns. The dependent variable in the housing regression is the owner’s
subjective assessment of the value of his/her home. These values are top coded at the 97% each
year; for most of the sample this is $300,000. The empirical model includes jurisdiction- and yearfixed effects, as well as jurisdiction-specific linear time trends. Robust (White) standard errors are
reported in parentheses below each coefficient. Standard errors are permitted to cluster at the
jurisdiction level. Each regressions includes the relevant covariates listed in summary statistics
table. Moreover, the rental and housing regressions include building age squared and bedrooms
squared variables. The wage regressions include age of worker squared as well as major
industry and major occupation dummies. A */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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Table 4. Tort reform data from Rubin and Shepherd.

Specification

Dependent variable

Non-econ damages cap

Punitive damages cap

Higher ev standard for
punitive damages
Caps in product liability
cases
Prejudgment interest
reform
Collat. src. rfm.: offset
awards
Collat. src. rfm.: admit ev

Date range
Observations
R-Squared

R&S
Tab.
V†
Nonauto
death
rate
0.039
(0.01)
0.008
(0.01)
0.026
(0.01)
0.032
(0.01)
0.048
(0.01)
0.055
(0.01)
0.025
(0.01)

***

Rental

Housing

Wage

Wage

Monthly
rent

Value

Hourly
wage

Weekly
wage

-0.24
(8.10)

2811.69
(5857.69)

0.044
(0.07)

-2
(4.32)

**

0.001
(0.07)

-4.928
(4.97)

***

-0.118
(0.09)

-2.841
(4.67)

0.199***
(0.07)

4.708
(4.24)

0.059
(0.16)
-0.119
(0.17)

2.058
(8.16)
-4.532
(8.21)

19812003
188365
0.45

19812003
280881
0.52

-15.89
(8.83)

*

***

-10.67
(6.51)

12034.84
(5987.48)
18451.84
(5363.91)

***

10.83
(9.76)

2500.07
(5814.12)

9.61
(9.90)
3.02
(8.61)

12917.24
(6944.75)
6822.61
(6497.72)

19812003
103419
0.49

19812003
117270
0.56

***
***
**

Notes. See notes for Table 3.
† Rubin and Shepherd stress that these findings are preliminary.
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Table 5. Abortion access law data from Klick and Klick & Stratmann.

Specification

Klick
Tab. 3

Dependent variable

Female
suicides/
100k
women

Restriction on
medicaid funding

0.091
(0.04)

K&S Tab.
2
White,
female
gonorrhea
cases/100k
pop < 20
**

-0.106
(0.04)

Housing

Wage

Wage

Monthly
rent

Value

Hourly
wage

Weekly
wage

-0.109
(0.16)

-5.143
(6.34)

0.151
(0.27)
-0.09
(0.09)
0.024
(0.06)
0.121
(0.12)
0.101
(0.08)

6.515
(11.17)
-1.01
(4.63)
6.514
(5.43)
13.094**
(5.97)
3.168
(3.86)

19811998
145749
0.44

19811998
209963
0.53

-2.27
(9.44)

Restriction enjoined
Mandatory waiting
period
Waiting period
enjoined
Parental notification
law
Notification enjoined

Rental

**

-9.541
(3.45)

***

11.94
(12.18)
-1.53
(5.68)
18.16
(6.63)
35.39
(16.38)
13.69
(8.10)
19811998
76766
0.52

Date range
Observations
R-Squared

Notes. See notes for Table 3.
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***
**
*

-7829.16
(3994.47)
11530.00
(7951.72)
8140.65
(2520.32)
4013.55
(2112.40)
9135.61
(7808.21)
9986.88
(3296.00)
19811998
76524
0.54

*

***
*

***

Table 6. No-fault auto liability data from RAND; comparison with Cummins, Phillips and Weiss and with Cohen & Dehejia.

Specification

Dependent variable
No-fault

CPW
Tab. 3
OLS
state
effects
Fatal
auto
accident
rate
1.688
n/a

Date range
Observations
R-Squared

***

C&D
Tab. 7
(6)

Rental

Housing

Wage

Wage

Fatalities
per 10k
pop

Monthly
rent

Value

Hourly
wage

Weekly
wage

-6.11
(5.55)

-5270.20
(3335.57)

-0.148
(0.15)

-8.044
(7.77)

19741995
132685
0.65

19741995
154274
0.56

19791995
132929
0.45

19791995
182386
0.55

0.258
(0.07)

***

Notes. See notes for Table 3.
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Table 7. Divorce law data from Friedberg; also comparison with Stevenson & Wolfers.

Specification

Friedberg
Tab.
4
(4.2)

S&W
Tab. 4
(c)

S&W
Tab. 4
(c)

Rental

Housing

Wage

Wage

Dependent variable

Divorces/
1k
pop.

Log
husb.
on wife
violence

Log
wife on
husb.
severe
violence

Monthly
rent

Value

Hourly
wage

Weekly
wage

Unilateral divorce

-0.038
(0.02)

**

-0.03
(0.01)

***

Unilateral divorce &
no-fault prop. division

0.545
(0.07)

***

-18.35
(9.56)

*

Unilateral divorce &
fault prop. division

0.392
(0.06)

***

-18.34
(7.77)

**

19741987
99587
0.54

Date range
Observations
R-Squared

Notes. See notes for Table 3.
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21999.94
(5774.26)
16595.57
(3101.98)
19741987
132367
0.55

***

***

-0.007
(0.06)
0.268***
(0.04)
19791987
70157
0.49

18.388***
(3.41)
-4.090*
(2.24)
19791987
76234
0.56

Table 8. Health insurance mandates data from Klick & Stratmann.

K&S
(2005)
Tab. 5

K&S
(2003)
Tab. 4
(iii)

Rental

Housing

Wage

Wage

Dependent variable

BMI

Beer
consump.
(gallons/
person)

Monthly
rent

Value

Hourly
wage

Weekly
wage

Diabetic * Diabetes
coverage mandate

0.401
(0.13)

0.024
(0.08)

-1.513
(4.56)

Specification

Diabetes coverage
mandate
Mental health parity law
with alcohol coverage
Mental health parity law

***

17.21
(5.55)
0.025
(0.01)

***

12929.36
(3315.22)

***

***

Date range
Observations
R-Squared

Notes. See notes for Table 3.
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5.86
(6.23)

-3190.06
(3158.48)

-0.034
(0.07)

-3.438
(4.02)

19811999
86810
0.5

19811999
91362
0.54

19811999
161307
0.44

19811999
235307
0.53

Table 9. Multiple laws data.

Specification

Rental

Dependent variable

Monthly
rent

Separate regressions
Housing
Wage
Value

Non-econ damagescap
cap
Punitive damages cap

-0.24
(8.10)
-15.89
(8.83)

Higher ev standard for
punitive damages
Caps in product liability
cases
Collat. src. rfm.: offset
awards
Collat. src. rfm.: admit
evid.

-10.67
(6.51)
10.83
(9.76)
9.61
(9.90)
3.02
(8.61)

2811.69
(5857.69)
12034.84
(5987.48)
18451.84
(5363.91)
2500.07
(5814.12)
12917.24
(6944.75)
6822.61
(6497.72)

No-fault

-6.11
(5.55)

-5270.20
(3335.57)

Diabetes coverage
mandate
Mental health parity law

17.21
(5.55)
5.86
(6.23)

Date range
Observations
R-Squared

*

***

12929.36
(3315.22)
-3190.06
(3158.48)

**

***

*

***

Wage

Rental

Hourly
wage

Weekly
wage

Monthly
rent

0.044
(0.07)
0.001
(0.07)

-2
(4.32)
-4.93
(4.97)

-10.37
(9.60)
-18.76
(8.72)

-0.118
(0.09)
0.199***
(0.07)
0.059
(0.16)
-0.119
(0.17)

-2.84
(4.67)
4.708
(4.24)
2.058
(8.16)
-4.53
(8.21)

0.24
(7.90)
19.79
(7.92)
-6.47
(7.19)
2.61
(7.26)

-0.148
(0.15)

-8.04
(7.77)

1.09
(7.75)

0.024
(0.08)
-0.034
(0.07)

-1.51
(4.56)
-3.44
(4.02)

14.51
(6.28)
0.23
(5.70)
19811995
69750
0.53

Varies
Varies
Varies

Notes. See notes for Table 3.
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Joint regression
Housing
Wage

**

**

Value

Weekly
wage

-4156.57
(4518.01)
-74.40
(2480.10)

0.046
(0.10)
0.05
(0.10)

-3.546
(5.49)
7.225
(5.87)

-0.064
(0.10)
0.242***
(0.08)
0.057
(0.09)
0.016
(0.13)

-7.926
(5.59)
6.103
(5.32)
11.770**
(4.92)
-10.79
(6.43)

-0.068
(0.11)

-5.337
(8.91)

-0.141*
(0.08)
0.118**
(0.06)

-4.003
(8.10)
0.911
(3.41)

19811995
122329
0.44

19811995
171193
0.54

-8368.39
(3347.36)
7624.60
(2524.70)
9196.62
(2689.07)
-7915.49
(3533.70)

**
***
***
**

139.47
(6973.65)

**

Wage

Hourly
wage

-9024.67
(4028.87)
634.58
(3525.46)
19811995
66339
0.52

**
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